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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050509-CA

vs.
JOHN MARK HEATON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals a conviction for possession or use of a controlled substance
with priors in a drug-free zone, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004); and
intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in a violation of 76-9-701(1) (West 2004), in the
Second Judicial District Court in Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Darwin
C. Hansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
First Issue: Did the trial court comply with its statutory duty to resolve
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report when it considered each
complaint and made the requested alterations?
Standard of Review: "'Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal
duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing
reports is a question of law that we review for correctness.'" State v. Johnson, 2006
UT App 3, f 6, 129 P.3d 282 (quoting State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \ 23, 94
P.3d295).
Second Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied
defendant's request for probation?
Standard or Review: "We review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for
abuse of discretion." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 548 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)). "We traditionally afford the
trial court wide latitude and discretion in sentencing . . . ." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT
30, H 31, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)).
"Abuse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were
"inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive sentence.'"" Houk,
906 P.2d at 909 (citations omitted). This Court "may only find abuse 'if it can be said
that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
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Third Issue: Was trial counsel ineffective in presenting defendant's
corrections to the PSI, even though he articulated each correction defendant requested
and convinced the trial court to adopt all of them?
Standard of Review: Because this claim is inadequately briefed, the Court
should not consider it and no standard of review applies. If the Court chooses to
address the claim on the merits, it should be resolved as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) ("When, as in this case, the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, we resolve
the issue as a matter of law") (footnote omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes in pertinent part are attached at addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information with one count of possession or use of
a controlled substance with priors in a drug-free zone, a first-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
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Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004); and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in a
violation of 76-9-701(1) (West 2004). R. 1-2.1
Defendant was convicted on all counts following a jury trial on September 7,
2004. R. 50-52. Defendant failed to appear for the trial and a no-bail bench warrant
was issued for his arrest after his conviction. R. 51.
Defendant was sentenced to 1-15 years in prison for possession of a controlled
substance, 365 days in jail on the paraphernalia count and 90 days in jail for
intoxication. R. 112. The sentences were imposed concurrently. Id.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 113.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 6, 2002, police responded to a report of a possible fight. R.
131:79. Police found defendant and another man in a parked car near Second North
and Main Street in Bountiful. Id. Defendant was in the back seat and had difficulty
speaking or moving. R. 131:83-84. In fact, he was so incapacitated that he could not
retrieve his wallet from his pocket and could not stand without assistance when asked
to exit the vehicle. R. 131:83, 85. Defendant was arrested and a search of the vehicle

1

Defendant was convicted in two separate cases and has filed separate appeals
raising identical issues concerning the corrections to the Presentence/Postsentence
Report. In case no. 20050508, defendant is appealing his conviction for possession or
use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and possession or use of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed sentence for both
cases during a single hearing using the same PSI, which was prepared in connection
with both cases. Because the legal issues in both cases are identical, they should be
consolidated on appeal.
4

yielded syringes that tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine and heroin. R.
131:95-96.
After defendant's conviction, the trial court ordered the Department of
Corrections to prepare a presentence investigation report (PSI). Sentencing was
originally scheduled for April 28, 2005, but was continued for a week to allow
defendant an opportunity to review and correct the PSI. R. 130:42-43. On May 4,
2005, defendant appeared with counsel and made at least 11 specific corrections to
the PSI, each of which was accepted by the court.
First Correction
MR. UTZINGER: [T]he second full paragraph that begins with the
sentence, "Mr Heaton has been known to associate with individuals
involved in criminal activity and/or illegal drug use." Mr. Heaton
objects to that. He says that's not the case and that there's not a basis
for asserting that.
THE COURT: I understand that the defendant denies that.
R. 130:49-50.
Second Correction
MR. UTZINGER: [W]ith respect to his employment, he
indicates that he did specify that his last employment was with
White Stag Electric. So the last sentence didn't specify when he last
maintained gainful employment. . . . He's been working for them the
last couple of months . . .
THE COURT: After the trial?
MR. UTZINGER: After the trial.
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
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MR. UTZINGER: He indicates prior to the trial he was working
at a company called TransCo.
THE COURT: Okay.
R. 130:50-51.
Third Correction
MR. UTZINGER: [0]n Page 4, Defendant's Statement, he feels
the reason why he didn't provide a written statement is because he
wasn't provided that opportunity and if he had more time to sit down
and compose something it would be more thorough than these
statements. His concern is with respect to the April 7 episode . . . the
incident at his mother's house, that it's just simply making it sound
like he was denying anything happened, it was all the police's fault
and that was not his intent.. .
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
R. 130:51-52.
Fourth and Fifth Corrections
MR. UTZINGER: [U]nder the hearing Adult Record . . . [h]e
indicated what actually happened in that case is he pled to an offense
of attempted possession of cocaine and that he doesn't recall there
being any issue of fraud involved .. . The entry [of] July 19, 1989[,
he] indicates there was no charge of driving on suspension.
THE COURT: Okay.
R. 130:52.
Sixth Correction
MR. UTZINGER: [U]nder the heading Defendant's Life
History[, t]he defendant would like to add a sentence to the effect
that as a child he was severely physically and mentally abused by his
mother, as a child from birth up to adulthood.
THE COURT: By his mother from?
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MR. UTZINGER: He indicates basically since birth.
THE DEFENDANT: Until I became an adult and then MR. UTZINGER: Mental duress, I believe he still feels is
ongoing.
THE COURT: Okay.
R. 130:53.
Seventh Correction
MR. UTZINGER: The next sentence, the one that begins with
"defendant has been involved in a long term relationship with
DeeAnn Jo[o]s", he indicates that's not accurate insofar as it
suggests it is still ongoing . ..
THE COURT: Okay.
Eighth Correction
MR. UTZINGER: Page 8, the first full paragraph, that should
indicate that he suffers from Mieneres Disease . . .
THE COURT: What kind of a disease is that?
THE DEFENDANT: It's a neurological disease.
THE COURT: You on medication?
THE DEFENDANT: There's really no medication for it. It's
just—they said it was brought on from a combination of being [in] a
coma for about a month.
THE COURT: All right.
THE DEFENANT: A water heater dropped on my head and I
suffer from continual ringing in my ears and bouts of dizziness.
THE COURT: Okay.
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R. 130:54.
Ninth Correction
MR. UTZINGER: . . . Under the heading, Education,
Employment, Financial Information, the last sentence of that
paragraph, first paragraph, indicates he didn't indicate any plans for
furthering his education in the near future. He indicates to me that
he in fact claims that he has been accepted into vocational
rehabilitation program at ITT.
THE COURT: When?
THE DEFENDANT: That was like the day before the trial.
R. 130:54-55.
Tenth Correction
t MR. UTZINGER: . . . [MJoving to the heading Substance Abuse
History, the last paragraph of that page indicates that he's been given
opportunities for substance abuse therapy and treatment over the
years and his contention is he does not believe that accurate. He was
allowed to participate in the RSAT program but beyond that, he
indicates he has not been provided or afforded an opportunity for
substance abuse therapy . . .
R. 130:55.
Eleventh Correction
MR. UTZINGER: In terms of collateral contacts, he indicated he
would like to have his father, grandmother and sister, Shauna,
contacted and that he did not ask that his mother be contacted.
R. 130:55-56.
Twelfth Correction
MR. UTZINGER: And then under the Supervision Risk, Mr. Heaton
asserts that he's never absconded from any program or any supervision and I
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at this point don't have a way of verifying or refuting that other than that's
what he's indicated.
THE COURT: Very well.
R. 130:56-57.
After noting those corrections, defendant's counsel directed the court's
attention to Form 1 of the PSI, which contains the Criminal History Assessment and
sentencing matrix. R. 130:56; R. 141. Under the Criminal History Assessment,
which assigns a numerical value to various factors in the defendant's criminal history,
defendant was given a score of 12, which placed him in category IV of the matrix.
R. 141. As a category IV offender with a conviction for a second degree drug offense,
defendant's position on the sentencing matrix called for 24 months imprisonment. Id.
Counsel stated that the corrections would reduce defendant from category 4 to
category 2, which would also reduce his recommended sentence from 24 months to
18 months with the possibility of probation. R. 130:57.
The prosecutor had no objection to the corrections. R. 141:57. Defense
counsel then requested that defendant be granted probation and re-enrolled in RSAT,
a drug treatment program. R. 141:59-60. Defendant admitted to the court that he was
unable to stop using drugs, despite having previously served thirteen years in prison
and participated in RSAT. R. 141:60-61. Defendant requested a rehabilitation
program in which he would be required to provide urine samples three times a week.
R. 141:62.
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The State stood by its recommendation of prison time. The prosecutor
explained that he was not relying on the PSI matrix in making his recommendation,
and noted defendant's poor history with drug treatment programs and multiple
probation violations. R. 141:63-64. He explained that the prison operates a drug
board program, similar to the program defense counsel had requested for defendant,
which provided frequent testing and treatment. R. 141:64. Thus, the prosecutor
recommended prison time, with a recommendation that defendant participate in the
drug board program. R. 141:65.
The court found that defendant's corrections to the PSI were "necessary and
appropriate to give accuracy to the report." R. 141:66. However, it found that those
changes, in light of the circumstances, were not relevant to defendant's sentence. Id.
Specifically, the court noted defendant's failure to make use of programs such as
RSAT in the past, and explained that "sometimes you get to the point where you have
to protect the public by having a person in a custodial facility where there is sufficient
security." Id. The court recommended defendant's participation in the drug board
program, and reminded defendant that "[he would] be able to participate but [he had]
to decide whether [he would] or whether [he would not]." R. 141:68. Finally, the
court encouraged defendant to take advantage of the resources offered to him "so that
[he could] change [his] life." Id.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court made a determination on the record of the accuracy and
relevancy of defendant's objections to the pre-sentence investigation report. It did not
fail in its statutory duty to consider defendant's objections. After making this
determination, the court weighed all the circumstances and found that defendant
should be sentenced to prison. The sentence was neither unreasonable, excessive, nor
inherently unfair. Nor was defendant's trial counsel ineffective in presenting the
corrections to the court.

Indeed, trial counsel meticulously asserted each of

defendant's suggestions and the trial court ultimately adopted all of the corrections.
ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court failed "to duly consider [defendant's]
objections and specifically resolve them on the record" and failed to "comply with its
legal duty to properly resolve pre-sentence investigation report objections." Aplt. Br.
at 7. In support of his argument, defendant cites State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,973 P.2d
404, and its progeny. See also State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 6 P.3d 1133; State v.
Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 94 P.3d 295. In those cases, trial courts sentenced
defendants without making any determination of the relevance and accuracy of
alleged inaccuracies in defendants' PSI reports, as mandated by Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-l(6)(a) (attached at addendum B). Defendant asks this Court to set aside his
sentence and remand to the district court for re-sentencing. Aplt Br. at 15. However,
the court complied with its duty in this case. Moreover, it accepted as true all of
11

defendant's alleged inaccuracies. The trial court, after taking all of these corrections
into account, appropriately exercised its discretion and rejected defendant's request
for probation.
L

THE TRIAL COURT COMPLIED WITH ITS
STATUTORY DUTY TO DETERMINE THE ACCURACY
AND RELEVANCE OF DEFENDANT'S CORRECTIONS
TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.

When a defendant informs the court of an inaccuracy in the presentence
investigation report, the court has a statutory duty to address and resolve the
inaccuracy on the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2004). The
Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this as requiring sentencing courts to make "an
express determination of the parties' objections to the presentence report on the
record." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, \ 45 n.6,973 P.2d 404. Failure to do so is error.
Id. Furthermore, the trial court commits error when it fails to make specific findings
on the record, even when it is "clearly aware of the issues and the alternative
characterization urged by defendant." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, TJ15,6 P.3d 1133.
The court complied with its duty in this case. Defendant raised several
objections to the PSI, including the date of a conviction, his relationship with the
mother of his children, the reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor, and his
mother's name being listed as a collateral contact. See R. 141:49-56. The court
actively participated in this process, repeatedly asking clarifying questions. See e.g.,
R. 141:50 (asking for name of employ er),R. 141:54 (asking for details of defendant's

12

neurological disease),R. 141:54 (clarifying defendant's relationship to his daughters).
The court had clearly reviewed the PSI prior to sentencing. See R. 141:47 (stating
that it had reviewed PSI),R. 141:49 (explaining that court had already recognized and
made defendant's first correction). Furthermore, the record indicates that the court
was taking notes throughout the colloquy with defendant. See R. 141:52 (defense
counsel asks court, "[A]m I going too fast? You're writing and I'm talking."), R.
141:53 (asking defense counsel for a minute to catch up), R. 141:54 (asking for
' spelling of disease).
After so engaging with defendant and defense counsel, the court stated:
With regard to the corrections that you've made to the pre-sentence
report, I find those corrections necessary and appropriate to give
accuracy to the report but nevertheless I don't find the nature of the
corrections to have any significant impact upon the Court's sentence
that the Court is going to impose.
R. 141:66. Thus, these changes, although necessary, did not convince the court that
defendant should be granted probation. Id. Instead, it followed the recommendation
of the State and the PSI, noting defendant's recurring drug problems and the drug
treatment programs available in prison. Id.
Defendant contends that the trial court, by actively listening to defendant's
corrections and granting all of defendant's alteration requests, failed "to duly consider
the inaccuracies" and "did not comply with its duty to properly resolve [defendant's]
objections." Aplt. Br. at 12. Defendant offers no suggestion of how much treatment
the court should have given each alleged inaccuracy in order to "duly consider" it.

13

However, he appears to misunderstand the scope of section 77-18-1 (6)(a). The code
"does not require the judge to rewrite the presentence investigation report, [but]
require[s] the judge to make a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the
report on the record." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, % 44 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The court did so in this case. Although it did not "rewrite" the PSI, or
repeat each alleged inaccuracy, it actively considered them and granted each of
defendant's requests. A remand for more specific findings would be an empty
gesture, as the court already found that those changes, when accepted at face value,
were not weighty enough to alter its sentencing decision.
This case is distinguishable from Jaeger and its progeny because the trial
courts in those cases either neglected or refused to address the corrections. See
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^[ 42-45 (holding that court failed to resolve objections when it
stated, "[T]he presentence report is the way it is . . . . As far as my amending or
changing the presentence report, I will not make a decision either way."); State v.
Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ffi[ 34-35, 999 P.2d 7 (noting that court did not address the
objections); Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 15 (holding that trial court erred by failing to
address two specific objections, even though aware of the issues); Maroney, 2004 UT
App 206, \ 27 (holding that court failed to make requested findings on the record).
Under these cases, defendants are prejudiced only when alleged errors are not
remedied. In this case, the court remedied each alleged inaccuracy by finding that
they were necessary to the report's accuracy. R. 141:66. Defendant could not be
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harmed by inadequate investigation when the inadequacy resolved the matter in his
favor. Moreover, defendant has already received any benefit that could result from a
remand. At best, the court would find that the alterations were still accurate. On the
other hand, if the court looked more closely into defendant's allegations, it could find
that several of the alleged inaccuracies, which were contested only by defendant's
memory, were in fact accurate. Thus, if defendant's request were granted, he could
conceivably be placed in a worse position.
Defendant, therefore, actually does not complain of the court's consideration
of the alleged inaccuracies. Rather, he complains of his sentence, but masks his
complaint under the rubric of Jaeger. In reality, he argues that because the court was
not persuaded that alleged inaccuracies were mitigating, it failed to duly consider
them. This argument is without merit.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO PRISON.

"We review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion."
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 548 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Houk, 906 P.2d
907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)); see also State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App.
1993). "We traditionally afford the trial court wide latitude and discretion in
sentencing

" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30,1J 31, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v.

Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). "Sentencing requires such discretion
because it 'necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court.5" Woodland. 945
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P.2d at 671 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,1135 (Utah 1989)). "Abuse of
discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently
unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive sentence.5"" State v. Houk, 906
P.2d at 909 (citations omitted). This Court "may only find abuse 'if it can be said that
no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citation
omitted). Moreover, "so long as basic constitutional safeguards of due process and
procedural fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in considering
any and all information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence." Johnson,
2006 UT App 3, Tf 7 (quotations and citation omitted).
Although a few of defendant's alterations arguably presented mitigating
factors, such as his neurological disease, R. 141:54, his assertion that he does not
associate with known criminals, R. 141:49, and the reduction of his 1986 felony
offense to a misdemeanor, R. 141:52, several weighty factors were not altered by
defendant. Even taking into account the two changes defendant made to his criminal
history, defendant has been previously convicted of thirteen misdemeanors and two
felonies. See R. 134-36. Defendant has violated the terms of his probation and parole
on numerous occasions. See R. 134 (1989 misdemeanor probation revoked), R. 135
(1990 felony probation revoked, 1993 parole violation, 1994 parole violation).
Defendant also admitted that he could not stop using drugs outside of state custody:
"although jail and prison [] does work for a while because it keeps you off the street
and it keeps you away from drugs [,] once I'm out, I go right back to normal." R.
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141:61. The court expressed its concern: "[Yjou're telling me right now that you
know how to say no, you don't want drugs but if I let you out of jail, then
theoretically what you're telling me is next week, then you don't know how to say no,
you use drugs." R. 141:62. Defendant later opined, "They say if you can get a year
sobriety down your belt that it would be easy [to quit]." R. 141:62-63. The court then
sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences on both his felony and misdemeanor
convictions, R. 141:67, and recommended that he receive drug treatment in prison. R.
141:67-68. Thus, defendant will receive a year without access to drugs and treatment
in a drug program.
In this case, the court weighed the mitigating circumstances presented by
defendant against defendant's criminal history, rehabilitative needs, and previous
probation and parole violations. The court explained that defendant needed to be
placed in state custody to protect the public. R. 141:66. The court complied with
statutory limits: it sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of zero to five years
in prison, and recommended defendant's placement in the drug board program. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). Defendant's sentence is not inherently
unfair or excessive. The court's decision was reasonable.
It is irrelevant whether the matrix recommendation, after defendant's
alterations, technically would have placed defendant in row two or three. It is wellestablished that "the recommendations of the prosecutor or any other party are not
binding upon the court." State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1989)
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(citation omitted). Even the Board of Pardons and Parole is not bound by the matrix
calculation: the PSI indicates that matrices "are guidelines only. They do not create
any right or expectation on behalf of the offender." R. 139. Moreover, the court
would not have abused its discretion if it had sentenced defendant without the aid of a
PSI. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) ("Prior to the imposition of any sentence,
the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant," obtain a presentence report)
(emphasis added); see also State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, \ 16, 57 P.3d 1134
(trial court has discretion under statute to sentence defendant without PSI). Given the
wide discretion afforded trial courts at sentencing, the trial court here acted well
within its discretion by denying defendant's request for probation.
III.

DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE IT IS
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.

Defendant claims that "[t]o the extent that appointed trial counsel failed to
specifically request that the sentencing court exercise its fact[-] finding function to
resolve the inaccuracies in the presentence investigation, he committed ineffective
assistance of counsel." Aplt. Br. at 14. This argument is so terse and undeveloped as
to hardly merit a reply. Suffice to say, the two paragraphs of analysis defendant
devotes to this claim are wholly inadequate. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The rule
provides:
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
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reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied of.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App
370, f 8,995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of
the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court'") (citation omitted).
Adequate briefing is especially important with claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, which must include specific details concerning counsel's alleged errors.
To establish that such serious errors occurred, a defendant must identify counsel's
specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App. 1997)
(citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Proof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable
reality.'" State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (citingFernandez
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). Because defendant's ineffective assistance
claim lacks the requisite specificity, this Court should decline to consider it.
In any event, the claim is without merit and should be rejected.

As

demonstrated in Points I and II, above, trial counsel carefully delineated 12 or more
alleged inaccuracies in the PSI and the trial court accepted each of them prior to
imposing sentence.

Accordingly, defendant cannot show either the deficient

performance or prejudice required by Strickland to demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this|£f%ay of May, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the^^day of May, 20061 caused to be U.S. Mail two copies
of the foregoing to:
Scott L. Wiggins
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

fUMft-, Q
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Addenda

Addendum A

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*S Chapter 3. Punishments
*l Part 2. Sentencing
-4§ 76-3-203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides otherwise,
for a term of not less than five years and which may be for life.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years.

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*M Chapter 18. The Judgment
-•§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—ProbationSupervision—Presentence
investigation—Standards—ConfidentialityTerms
and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or
extension—Hearings— Electronic monitoring
*

*

*

(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence
of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from
the department or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the
crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of
pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department

regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and
are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by
rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to
the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten
working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department.
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make
a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.

Addendum B

PRIVATE
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE
REGION II-D - FARMINGTON
883 West 100 North (Box 700)
FARMINGTON, UTAH 84025
(801) 451-4700
PRESENTENCE/POSTSENTENCE REPORT
Date Due: 4-25-2005
Sentencing Date: 4-28-2005
JUDGE Darwin C. Hansen.
Farmington,
(City)
Connie LaPlant
NAME: HEATON, John Mark
AKA's: David William Heaton
ADDRESS: 2616 W 1700 N
Clinton, UT 84015
BIRTHDATE:7-22-1963 AGE: 41
MARITAL STATUS: Single
Court Case No.
031701805

Offense
Poss C/S, F3;
Poss Paraphernalia, MB

031701806/

Poss C/S, F2; Poss
Paraphernalia, MA;
Intoxication, MC

Second District
Davis
(County)

COURT

UTAH

INVESTIGATOR
OFFENDERS 41173
PROS. ATTORNEY: Brandon Poll
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: ToddUtzinger
INTERPRETER: NA
LANGUAGE: English
CODEFENDANT(S): Sean Rankin
(031701806)
Plea
Guilty

Guilty

Conviction Date
9-29-2004

9-29-2004

RECOMMENDATION: The Adult Probation and Parole Staffing Committee respectfully
recommends John Mark Heaton be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the time period
prescribed by law.
EVALUATIVE ASSESSMENT / PROBLEM AREAS: John Mark Heaton scored "High" on
the risk/needs LSI Assessment Tool. The assessment identified significant problem areas with
criminal history; companions; leisure/recreation; drug abuse issues; and employment.
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EVALUATIVE ASSESSMENT/PROBLEM AREAS cont:
The defendant's criminal arrest history began in 1986 and consists of the following convictions
(including felony and misdemeanor convictions): possession of a controlled substance; theft
(twice); driving on a suspended license; reckless driving; false information (twice); burglary of a
building; conspiracy to commit robbery; failure to respond; attempted theft; attempted
possession of a controlled substance (twice); possession of drug paraphernalia; intoxication;
retail theft; and the current offenses. Due to his criminal arrest history we feel Mr. Heaton is not
amenable to supervision in a less restrictive setting at this time.
Mr. Heaton has been known to associate with individuals involved in criminal activity and/or
illegal drug use. He also admittedly has struggled with drug addiction for many years and states
he is currently in need of the skills to manage his drug abuse issues when he is living in the
community and not incarcerated. He described his current drug use as "binge use," advising he
"stays clean" for several months, and then "goes on a short-term drug binge." Mr. Heaton
recognizes and acknowledges his drug abuse issues.
Finally, for at least the past several months Mr. Heaton has been employed doing "odd jobs," and
"getting paid under the table." He didn't specify when he last maintained gainful employment.
OFFENSE:
Plea Agreement:
031701805: John Mark Heaton was originally charged with Possession of a Controlled
Substance (prior), a Third Degree Felony; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B
Misdemeanor; and Interfering with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. A Jury Trial
was held on or about September 29, 2004, and Mr. Heaton was found guilty in absentia to
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. He was found not guilty of Interfering with an Arresting
Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.
031701806: On or about September 29, 2004, John Mark Heaton was found guilty in absentia at
a jury trial, as charged to Possession of a Controlled Substance (DFZ), a Second Degree Felony;
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (DFZ), a Class A Misdemeanor; and Intoxication, a Class C
Misdemeanor.
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Factual Summary of the Offense:
031701805: On or about October 26, 2003, at approximately 2030 hours Clinton City Police
Officer Seth Jones contacted a male complainant at the Clinton City Police Department
regarding Mark Heaton. The complainant advised Mr. Heaton's mother contacted him and
advised her son had gone into the bathroom at her residence at approximately 1800 hours and
when she tried to contact him at the bathroom door sometime later, she couldn't hear any
movement inside and believed her son may have attempted suicide. Mrs. Heaton left the
residence and contacted the male complainant requesting assistance.
Incidentally, Officer Jones recognized Mr. Heaton's name from a previous incident in which Mr.
Heaton overdosed on heroin and Officer Jones and Sunset City Police Lieutenant Valdez
responded to the Heaton residence where Mr. Heaton was given an "adrenaline-type" shot to
resuscitate him.
Officer Jones and Clinton City Police Officer Wilson responded to the Heaton residence where
they entered the residence through the front door by force. The officers responded to the
bathroom where they contacted John Heaton through the door, which evidently, Mr. Heaton had
blocked with his body. After some time and the use of pepper spray, the officers were able to
enter the bathroom and take Mr. Heaton into custody.
Mr. Heaton was transported to the Davis North Hospital due to pepper spray contamination.
Officer Jones also responded to the hospital to take custody of Mr. Heaton upon his release.
While at the hospital, personnel drew Mr. Heaton's blood that tested positive for cocaine and
opiates. Mr. Heaton was ultimately involuntarily committed to a mental health facility.
While Officer Jones attended to Mr. Heaton at the hospital, Officer Wilson seized a syringe
containing blood from inside the bathroom where Mr. Heaton was found.
031701806: On or about November 6, 2003, at approximately 1700 hours Bountiful City Police
Officer Todd Hixson responded to 200 North Main, Bountiful, Utah regarding a fight in
progress.
Upon arrival, Officer Hixson observed two male individuals later identified as Sean Rankin and
John Heaton seated inside a blue vehicle. Officer Hixson observed Mr. Rankin in the front seat
of the vehicle, leaning over the seat facing Mr. Heaton. Officer Hixson contacted both parties
and after speaking to them and observing their behavior, believed they were under the influence
of an illegal substance and took them into custody without incident.
Once in custody, Officer Hixson discovered parts to a syringe in the backseat where Mr. Heaton
had been seated, two syringes containing a substance that later tested positive as heroin residue
inside Mr. Rankin's left front pants pocket, and one other syringe lying on the front seat of the
vehicle.
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Factual Summary of the Offense cont.:
031701806 cont:
Post Miranda, Mr. Rankin stated he and Mr. Heaton had traveled to Salt Lake City, Utah where
they purchased a balloon of heroin, traveled to Bountiful, Utah and used heroin together down
the street from their present location.
During questioning, Mr. Heaton denied the use of any illegal substance and further advised he
"barely knew Mr. Rankin."
Mr. Rankin and Mr. Heaton were arrested, transported and booked into the Davis County Jail.
Defendant's Statement: Mr. Heaton did not provide a written statement regarding these
offenses. During our interview on or about April 7, 2005, Mr. Heaton told me, with regard to the
first offense, the arresting officers forced entry into his parent's residence, deployed pepper spray
on him and forced him to ride in an ambulance to the hospital after he advised them he was not
in need of medical treatment. He further stated he felt he was treated with excessive force, and
blood was takenfromhim without his consent.
With regard to the second incident, Mr. Heaton told me on the day of his arrest he was with a
friend who took him to Mr. Rankin's residence because he (Mr. Heaton) needed a ride to work.
After learning neither he or Mr. Rankin possessed a valid drivers license, Mr. Rankin asked his
cousin to drive Mr. Heaton to work and shortly thereafter an argument ensued, the police arrived
and he was arrested because Mr. Rankin told the officers they both had used heroin, and he was
ultimately found guilty in absentia of the charges.
Custody Status: With regard to both cases, John Mark Heaton was booked into the Davis
County Jail on or about November 6, 2003. On or about March 18, 2004, Mr. Heaton posted
bond and was released from custody. On or about September 29, 2004, after failing to appear
before the Court a warrant was issued for Mr. Heaton's arrest. On or about March 21, 2005, Mr.
Heaton was booked into the Davis County Jail where he has remained in custody. At the time of
sentencing Mr. Heaton will have served approximately 170 days in custody for these offenses
and should be given credit at the discretion of the Court.
Co-Defendant(s) Status: On or about December 8, 2003, Sean Rankin pleaded guilty to
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony. On or about January 21, 2004,
Mr. Rankin was sentenced to a suspended prison term and placed on formal probation to Adult
Probation and Parole and ordered to complete the RS AT program at the Davis County Jail. On
or about January 31, 2005, Mr. Rankin's probation period was terminated under unsuccessful
circumstances.
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CRIMINAL HISTORY:
Juvenile Record: Mr. Heaton does not have a juvenile arrest history.
Adult Record:
Date
7-17-86

Agency
SLPD
860059416

Offense
Poss C/S by Fraud, F3

Disposition
10-22-00 Administrative
Closure of case

9-18-86

SLPD
861913891

Poss C/S, 2 cts, MA

1 year jail, sus; 30 days
jail; formal probation; fine
Terminated 11-14-88

7-19-89

Ogden PD
896401550

DOS, MB; Reckless
Driving, MB; Theft, MB

40 days jail; fine
FTA Warrant (review)4-19-90
5-10-90 pymnt received,
warrant recalled
Terminated 9-13-90

7-31-89

Layton PD
891000734

Theft, MB

FTA Warrant 11-13-89
Arrested 4-30-90
40 days jail; fine; 12 mos
Court probation
FTA Warrant (review)1-17-92
Arrested 2-03-92
Terminated 10-20-98

4-29-90

DC SO
901000142

False Info, MB

60 days jail, CTS

7-06-90

Sunset PD
901100245

Forgery, 2 cts, F2

Dismissed
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CRIMINAL HISTORY cont.
Adult Record cont:
Date
7-21-90

1-26-92

Agency
OgdenPD
901900454

Offense
Burglary of Building, F3

So OgdenPD
921000681

Unlawful Use Financial
Trans Card, MA

9-14-93

Paroled

11-17-93

Parole violation

5-10-94

Paroled

Disposition
0-5 USP, sus; formal prob;
fine; restitution; 1 yr jail w/
release to Prison Diversion
Program
OSC 7-17-91
8-01-91 revoked/restarted
w/6 mo s jail
OSC Warrant 1-09-92
2-19-92 Committed USP
Dismissed

Returned USP

Conspiracy to Commit
Robbery, F3; Failure to
Respond, F3

7-17-99 originally
committed USP on Fl,
Agg Robbery, 5-Life;
Defendant appealed/
released 7-23-98;
Defendant later pleaded
guilty to reduced charges
of F3, Conspiracy to
Commit Robbery,
Committed USP 0-5

7-26-94

Parole violation

Returned USP

5-13-98

Terminated sentence at USP

7-13-94

1-02-99
7-13-99

RoyPD
941900536

So OgdenPD
991900023

Att Theft, MA;
Att Poss C/S, MA

5.5 mos jail, CTS

Received at USP re: 941900536

J
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CRIMINAL HISTORY cont.
Adult Record cont.:
Date
3-14-00

Agency

Offense
Disposition
Terminated sentence at USP

3-22-00

DC Attorney
001700329

Att Poss C/S, MA;
Poss Paraphernalia, MB;
Intoxication, MC

12 mos jail, Court prob.
RSAT
Terminated 4-08-04

2-22-01

SLPD
011903145

Retail Theft, MB

FTA Warrant 3-08-01
Arrested 8-28-01
9-05-01 CTS,
Case Closed

10-26-03

Clinton PD

Poss C/S, F3;
Poss Paraphernalia, MB

CURRENT OFFENSE

11-06-03

Bountiful PD

Poss C/S, F2; Poss
Paraphernalia, MB;
Intoxication, MC

CURRENT OFFENSE

False Info, MC

30 days jail

3-20-05

DC SO
051700462

DEFENDANT'S LIFE HISTORY/CURRENT LIVING SITUATION: John Mark Heaton
was born July 22, 1963, in San Diego, California to the union of Charles and Gwen Heaton. He
has two sisters, and one brother who passed away in approximately 1978, the result of a
drowning. The defendant and his family resided in Georgia; Alabama; San Diego, California; La
Habra, California; Corona, California; and Tampa, Florida. At the age of 21 he moved with his
family to Ogden, Utah. Other than his brother's death, he cannot recall encountering any
unusual problems during his childhood and reportedly got along well with his parents and
siblings. Upon his release from custody the defendant plans to reside with his parents in Clinton,
Utah.
The defendant has been involved in a long-term relationship with Deanne Joos. Together they
have three children: Shaylynn age 20; Karissa age 17; and Shawn age 13. Shawn is not the
defendant's "biological" son, but as far as the defendant is concerned Shawn is his son.
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DEFENDANT'S LIFE HISTORY/CURRENT LIVING SITUATION cont."
Mr. Heaton reports he suffers from continual pain as the result of a torn right scapula and two
herniated discs in his neck; injuries sustained in a car accident some years ago. He hasn't
recently been hospitalized for any serious illness or accident, and he is not currently taking any
prescribed medication. He has never been physically, mentally or sexually abused. He reports
he "accidentally overdosed" on heroin six days after his release from the Utah State Prison in
2000. The defendant would be willing to participate in mental health therapy should the Court
order him to do so.
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION: The defendant
earned his GED in 1987 through Weber State University in Ogden, Utah. He didn't indicate any
plans to further his education in the near future.
For at least the past several months Mr. Heaton has been employed "doing odd jobs," receiving
pay "under the table." As a result of his sporadic, unstable employment, Mr. Heaton's financial
situation is not good. He reports being in debt $15,000.00 in the form of medical bills; child
support; and past due cell phone payments. He has never had any property repossessed; he has
never filed for bankruptcy and he has no plans to file for bankruptcy in the near future. He has
no valuable assets.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE HISTORY: Mr. Heaton reports he last consumed alcohol three years
ago, and he further advised he has never abused alcohol.
Previous Presentence Investigation Reports indicate Mr. Heaton first used illegal substances at
the age of 15, and further indicate he has experimented with the following illegal drugs:
marijuana; cocaine; LSD; and heroin. Most recently, the defendant has been using cocaine and
heroin. He last used those substances in August of 2004. He described his illegal drug use as
"binge use." He told me he will "stay clean" for two or three months, and then go on a "two to
three day drug binge." His "drug of choice" is heroin. Mr. Heaton acknowledges his substance
abuse problem and told me he receives adequate therapy when he is incarcerated but he is in
need of substance abuse therapy "immediately upon his release from custody," to learn the
necessary skills of how to maintain his sobriety while living in the community.
It appears from information contained in Mr. Heaton's Adult Probation and Parole file he
completed an inpatient substance abuse program in 1994. After further review of Mr. Heaton's
file, it appears he has been either Court ordered or ordered by the State of Utah Board of Pardons
and Parole to complete substance abuse therapy. Thus, he has been afforded the opportunity to
participate in various substance abuse therapy program's over the years, since first becoming
involved with AP&P in approximately 1986.
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS:
Mr. Heaton did not provide any collateral contacts. However, on April 12th and 13th, 2005,1
made unsuccessful attempts to contact Mr. Heaton's mother for a collateral contact on his behalf,
and to verify the information he provided to me.
Collateral Contact #1- Brandon Poll- the Prosecuting Attorney: Mr. Poll provided a
statement suggesting the State will concur with the recommendation of Adult Probation and
Pat ole. The State is also requesting a public defender fee in the amount of $500.
Appro ed:

Respectfully Submitted,

Connie LaPlant, Investigator

£PJ

Dean Godfrey, Supe.
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AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(Use Foim 3 also for Mandatory Imprisonment Sex Offender Sentences)
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1, 0*!lend>*i \ criminal conduct ncithcj caused nor Threatened serious harm.
2. OJTcncv <U*A ' under sarong pi avocation.
3. Theie \ >;w * • "Manual iiounds to excuse or justify cummal behavior, though failing to
e^abl*% * ,t
nse.
4. Otfom*"' N s 'ing.
5. CfTcaJLr <i * vd Uv> enforcement :n tht resolution of other crimes.
6. R**r,ii« *>p - uld be seveiely compromised by incarceration.
7. OiTcm " s »u<le suggests amenability ro supervision.
8. O'Tcnuor f;- exceptionally good employment and/or family i eJationships.
9. Iflipr^v ir\ %* uould entai! excessive hdidslup on offender or dependents.
10 OSenear )w, extended period of anesi-free street time.
11 Ollexjder ^j» l?ss active participant in the crime
12 \V ot" :•" f ore from a single ciurnnai episode.
x 3 O.'cr.si'r •- oinpkted OJ has neailv completed payment of restitution,
14 ( r e.
i
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